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LOBBYING THE REGULATORY STATE:
AN EXAMINATION OF REGULATION
AND REVOLVING DOOR LOBBYING
Charles Lowrance III

ABSTRACT
The prominence of lobbying activity in Washington, D.C., is well-known and often discussed by pundits
and legislators alike. For those familiar with the practice of lobbying, it is not a secret that many former
government employees become lobbyists and vice versa in a phenomenon often called the revolving door. Yet
to be determined, however, is what leads to these so-called revolving door lobbyists and what factors contribute
to a heightened number of them working on similar issues.
This study sought to determine if there is a relationship between the degree to which the federal government
regulates a certain industry and the number of revolving door lobbyists representing the interests of that
industry. This was accomplished by first determining a means of categorizing sectors of the economy and then
assessing the federal regulatory burden placed upon each sector and the number of lobbyists active in each
sector. Correlational analysis was then conducted to determine any relationship between the federal regulatory
burden and the number of lobbyists. Results suggest a positive relationship between the federal regulatory
burden and number of lobbyists—if there are more regulations, there will be more lobbyists. The analysis also
allowed for the construction of a predictive model that can be used to determine the likely number of revolving
door lobbyists active in a sector of the economy given a certain number of regulations relevant to the sector.
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One of the greatest threats to a democracy is the erosion
of its institutions from the inside out and, thus, the
eradication of public trust in them. Revolving door
lobbying, or at least the public’s perception of it, is the
prime example of this threat. I consider existing literature
to determine the causes and nature of this phenomenon
by which individuals move between working for the
government and working in government affairs roles and
conduct my own research on the explanatory and predictive
capabilities of one potential cause.
After compiling data on individual lobbyists, their previous
employment, and their clients, as well as data on the state
of federal regulation, I conducted a quantitative analysis
to examine the relationship between these variables. I ran
regression analyses to determine the correlation between
the test variables and use a marginal predicted values test to
evaluate the model’s predictive and explanatory capabilities.
The results of these tests suggest that the higher the
regulatory burden on an industry and the greater number
of words making up those regulations, the more revolving
door lobbyists there will be advocating on behalf of
that industry.

Literature Review

Throughout the history of the United States, and particularly
since the advent of statutory mandates for lobbying
disclosure in 1995, the total amount spent on lobbying has
grown. Since 1998, that amount has risen 217% from $1.45
billion annually to $3.16 billion annually in 2016 (The
Center for Responsive Politics, 2019). One of the benefits of
this requirement is the ability to study the revolving door—the
phenomenon where those with government jobs on their
résumés enter the business of influencing government—and
how it affects policy making in Washington. The challenges
of identifying revolving door lobbyists, hereafter referred to
as revolvers, are due to definitional loopholes and the onus of
responsibility falling upon the lobbyists themselves. Despite
the vast existing literature on revolving door lobbying, the
question of whether or not—and, if so, why—revolvers are
more prevalent in some industries is still unanswered.

Why Interests Lobby
One of the main problems that interest groups face is
the constant fluctuation in political priorities (LaPira &
Thomas, 2017). The vast majority never receive attention.
This inability to gain traction can be frustrating, especially
for groups whose goals and interests are relatively
inconsequential for the country as a whole (Baumgartner,
Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Leech, 2009).
Lobbyists aid clients in overcoming this hurdle by knowing
when the political tides are turning. A skilled lobbyist
with a keen sense of strategy will know the best time to
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push for a preferred policy and when to shift to a more
defensive strategy (Kingdon, 1984). While this is likely
the image that comes to mind for most people when they
think of lobbyists, lobbyists also play an entirely different
and equally important role in service of their clients.
Many interest groups will retain lobbyists to monitor the
workings of government, to report back on the state of law
and regulation pertaining to their industry, and to provide
expertise on a given policy area. For example, a parcel
delivery service might retain a team of lobbyists to monitor
the House Transportation Committee.
Some lobbyists only keep clients apprised of policy changes
that may be implemented, while others also serve as de
facto staff for the relevant Congressional committee(s).
This opportunity to supply members of Congress
with specialized information is relatively new. A
decline in committee staff and nonpartisan bureaucratic
analysts beginning in the 1970s has created a gap in
Congress’s information-gathering processes, affording
lobbyists access to the very minds they hope to sway
(Baumgartner & Jones, 2015).
The lobbying industry is one of influence and insurance.
Lobbyists with valuable process knowledge and a keen
sense of strategy play a monitoring role and tend to work
the offensive, whereas lobbyists with policy expertise
take up the defensive and provide political insurance for
their clients by providing Congress with information it
needs while casting that information in a light favorable
to their clients’ interests (LaPira & Thomas, 2017). The
determination that interest groups must perform when
hiring lobbyists is how to balance the two, a process that
depends upon the regulatory climates surrounding their
area of interest or industry.

Government Activity and Interest Group
Mobilization
Given that it is the goal of interest groups to affect policy
and the actions of government broadly, it seems logical that
this interest group activity causes government activity. A
study on the correlation of the growth of government and
the growth of interest groups suggests that the activity of
government actually serves as the demand-force (Leech,
Baumgartner, LaPira, & Semanko, 2005). The researchers
hypothesized that interest group mobilization would occur
when two factors intersect: an opinion or need on the part of
an interest group or a group capable of mobilizing resources
to influence policy and the possibility of government action.
This second factor led them to believe that interest groups
with desires far outside of the current focus of government
either do not exist or have a very low rate of success. They
noted that the necessity of the possibility of government
action is at the core of the definition of “interest” that
Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury (1997) established

in their study of Washington lobbying titled The Hollow Core:
Private Interests in National Policy Making:
It is at the intersection of public policy and the wants
and values of private actors that we discover interests.
What we call the interests of the groups are not
simply valued conditions or goals, such as material
riches, moral well-being, or symbolic satisfaction.
It is only as these are affected, potentially or in
fact, by public policy, by the actions of authoritative
public officials, that the valued ends are transformed
into political interests that can be sought or opposed
by interest groups. (p. 24)
To test their hypothesis, Leech et al. (2005) compiled data
from over 45,000 lobby registration reports from 1996 to
2000 and measures of government activity from the Policy
Agendas Project and examined at the issue area level
the relationship between the frequency of congressional
hearings and the number of firms active. The findings
suggest that lobbying activity follows the government and
that it is only after the government turns its attention to
a specific issue area that interest group activity relating to
that area begins to increase notably.

The Value of the Revolving Door
Because a legal requirement that lobbying activities be
disclosed was only enacted in the mid 1990s, it has only
recently been, established whether a trip through the
revolving door benefits a lobbyist in terms of skill marketability or greater ability to generate revenue. Using reports
filed by 637 contract lobbyists in accordance with the
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA), LaPira and Thomas
(2017) examined the differences in annual revenue between
conventional and revolving door lobbyists. Unsurprisingly,
their findings showed significantly greater mean and
median level revenue (measured by examining publiclyaccessible LDA disclosure forms) among the revolvers
(2.2:1 mean ratio and 3.3:1 median ratio, revolving door
lobbyist revenue to conventional lobbyist revenue). With a
difference of $181,075 in the mean revenue and a difference
of $156,760 in the median revenue, there is strong evidence
that previous government employment results in a higher
degree of annual revenue.
LaPira and Thomas (2017) also looked into the differences
in revenue among revolvers depending upon what position
in government they had previously served in. For example,
a former congressional staffer generated a median amount
of $307,500 a year in revenue, whereas a lobbyist without
previous congressional employment generated a median
amount of $70,000 a year in revenue. Former congressional
staffers earned $4.40 for every $1 earned by lobbyists with
no previous congressional employment. While rare, former
members of Congress (only 10 of the 637 lobbyists making

up the sample population fit this description) generated
the greatest amount of annual revenue. At the median,
members-turned-lobbyists generated $454,120 in a year—
roughly 648% of the median revenue generated by lobbyists
without previous congressional employment (LaPira &
Thomas, 2017).
While the data and findings do not necessarily reflect
the compensation of lobbyists, LaPira and Thomas (2017)
operate on the general assumption that lobbyists’ reported
revenue is a reliable indicator of their compensation as
lobbyists. Given this assumption, the findings can lead to
the conclusion that passing through the revolving door
increases the salary of someone with previous government
employment, which is an indicator that interest groups find
their unique background particularly valuable.

Explaining the Phenomenon
There are two schools of thought for explaining why
revolvers are more effective and therefore more highly
valued than conventional lobbyists. The first school believes
that revolvers are more highly valued due to the connectiondependent nature of Washington and the advantage
gained from having a network of individuals inside the
policymaking establishment. The second school—the one
most often subscribed to by lobbyists—believes that prior
government service provides an individual with greater
process-related knowledge. Having already worked within
the policymaking apparatus either as a member or a staffer,
this individual will have a deeper understanding of the
nuance and underlying norms of procedure that govern the
operations on Capitol Hill (Blanes i Vidal, Draca, & FonsRosen, 2012).

Differential Efficacy of the Revolving Door
Despite data showing that revolvers have a measurable
amount of particular process knowledge and a significant
degree of professional socialization (Salisbury, Johnson,
Heinz, Laumann, & Nelson, 1989), these factors do not
necessarily translate to tangible successes when it comes to
specific legislative goals. The fact that revolvers generate
significantly more revenue and are therefore more highly
valued than conventional lobbyists (LaPira & Thomas,
2017) does not answer the question, “Are revolving door
lobbyists more effective than conventional lobbyists?”

A Different Point of View
In considering the causes behind the disproportionately
higher value placed upon those who have passed through the
revolving door by firms and clients, it only seems rational to
consult with the lobbyists themselves. They represent their
clients’ interests and, as such, have particularly privileged
insight into how they carry out this project and what, if
anything, from their previous employment makes them
especially adept at doing so.
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An analysis of 776 interest representatives and subsequent
interviews that they sat for between 1983 and 1984 revealed
how lobbyists feel about their experience in government
(Salisbury et al., 1989). Some 80% stated that their previous
employment in government provided an increased degree
of familiarity with the decision-making process, while 70%
said that it provided them familiarity with issues pertaining
to their contracts. Of those who had worked in the executive
branch only, 53% said that their previous employment
provided them with contacts within the administration. On
the other hand, of those who had worked in Congress only,
a staggering 87% reported that their previous employment
provided them with contacts within Congress (Salisbury et
al., 1989).
The findings of Salisbury et al. (1989) suggest that lobbyists
place a very high value on their previous government
employment. Their testimonies support the second school
of thought in that they attribute the disproportionately
higher value of revolvers to their knowledge of the process.
Upon disaggregation, Salisbury et al.’s findings also support
the first school of thought, although mostly only in the case
of those who had previously served in Congress.

The Bureaucracy: A Second Revolving Door
While many revolvers come from Congress, notable
interest group activity surrounds the executive branch as
well. There was, however, almost no data on lobbying in
administrative agencies up until 2013. This is likely due to
the fact that the term “lobbying” typically elicits an image
of interests conveying their wishes to individuals who will
make a decision on policy at some point in the future and
not to those who will be tasked with implementing said
policy. Given that the administrative bureaucracy does
not typically have this sort of authority (at least not to the
degree that Congress does), the activity of interest groups in
this branch of government went mostly overlooked until a
2013 paper by Boehmke, Gailmard, and Patty.
LDA reports from 1996 show that of 9,388 incidents of
interest groups lobbying at the federal level, 3,817 occurred
within the administrative agencies. Nearly 41% of lobbying
occurred in the executive branch. In addition, 3,601 of the
5,570 groups that lobbied the legislative branch also lobbied
the executive branch, meaning that over 64% of interest
groups that actively lobbied Congress also had lobbyists
working somewhere within the administrative bureaucracy
(Boehmke et al., 2013).
These findings suggest that interest groups are aware of
the importance of being heard by policymakers as well
as by policy implementers, and that they are actively
mobilizing across governmental venues. In the context
of revolving door lobbying, it also seems to suggest an
entire submarket of former government officials that are
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marketable to lobbying firms and clients as having special
knowledge of the political process and a high degree of
professional socialization. Given the conclusion that
previous government service typically results in higher
levels of generated revenue (LaPira & Thomas, 2017) and
that connections to individuals still inside government
correlate with higher revenue (Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012),
it is not unlikely that former bureaucrats are similarly
more highly valuable as professional lobbyists.

The Growth of Regulatory Burden
In light of the theory of lobbying as an insurance policy
against the uncertainties of government (LaPira &
Thomas, 2017), it follows that these uncertainties need to
be quantified in a manner that is easy to understand and
analyze. As a part of an ongoing project to measure the
growth of the Federal Register (the official collection of
the agency rules, proposed rules, and public notices of the
federal government), scholars at the Mercatus Center have
done just that (McLaughlin & Sherouse, 2017). Utilizing
a text analysis algorithm that searches for keywords, they
constructed a database of regulatory constraints in the
Code of Federal Regulations (the actual codification of the
rules and regulations of the federal agencies and executive
departments) in a given year and the applicability of those
constraints to various industries as categorized by the North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
This project, known as RegData 3.1 in its current rendition,
demonstrates the accumulation of regulatory restrictions
over time. Between 1970 and 1981, restrictions were added at
a rate of about 24,000 per year. This pace slowed only slightly
over the next half decade before picking back up to 18,000
restrictions per year from 1985 to 1995. A decrease of 27,000
restrictions occurred from 1995 to 1996, which coincided
with the Republican Revolution and the passage of many
components of Speaker Gingrich’s Contract with America,
which were intended to deregulate the U.S. economy. In the
two decades since, the number of regulations identified in
the Code of Federal Regulations has grown by about 13,000
restrictions per year (McLaughlin & Sherouse, 2017).
While the data only covers the past half-century due to
the publication of yearly revisions to the entire code
beginning in 1967 (McKinney, 2018), it does suggest that
the general trend, irrespective of party control of Congress
or the Presidency, is that the number of regulations on the
books increases over time. As early as 1988, Shapiro and
Glicksman observed that this trend is concurrent with the
trend of increased legislative vagueness and the transfer of
discretion to the administrative bureaucracies. Perhaps not
coincidentally, the 1970s saw the abolition or defunding of
nonpartisan research agencies,the decline in congressional
committee staff (Kramer, 2017), and the rise of revolving
door lobbyists in Washington.

While existing literature paints a general picture of the
lobbying industry and provides insight into the role
revolvers play, it does not address two fundamental
questions regarding the demand for this special type
of lobbyist. First the historical collection of literature
does not include a focused, quantitative analysis of the
revolving door phenomenon and how and why it might
vary across different parts of the economy. Second, it has
yet to be shown whether a relationship exists between the
actual number of restrictive regulations relevant to an issue
category (a level of classification for sections of the economy
created by the Center for Responsive Politics) in the Code
of Federal Regulations in a given year and the number
of revolving door lobbyists representing clients classified
within that category in the same year. The following
sections analyze Lobbying Disclosure Act data compiled
by the Center for Responsive Politics and the outputs of
the RegData 3.1 algorithm from the Mercatus Center to
determine if the data shows a positive relationship.

lobbyists who have the knowledge necessary to understand
the political processes and who can keep their clients
apprised of any upcoming changes to relevant regulatory
frameworks. Additionally, lobbyists with policy experience
were well-positioned to fill the information-gathering gap
for Congress as they used their access to advocate for their
clients (Baumgartner & Jones, 2015).

Theory and
Hypotheses

From this causal explanation, I deduce the following
hypotheses: If there is a greater number of regulations
in the Code of Federal Regulations for a given industry
category in a given year, then there will be a greater
number of revolving door lobbyists with clients who are
classified within that category in the same year. If there is a
greater number of regulatory words in the Code of Federal
Regulations relevant to a given industry category in a given
year, then there will be a greater number of revolving door
lobbyists with clients who are classified within that category
in the same year.

The causal chain I propose is as follows: the destaffing of
congressional committees and the erosion of nonpartisan
research and analysis agencies led to increased vagueness
in the language of legislation passed by Congress. This
vagueness shifted responsibility to the executive branch
where bureaucrats were tasked with interpreting the
legislation, making determinations about what it actually
prescribed, and filling in the gaps left by the legislature.
This led to an increased tendency to go over and above the
actual intended purpose of a piece of legislation.
Bureaucrats typically spend their entire careers within their
respective agencies, and become skilled at administering the
various programs and policies of the federal government.
They are accustomed to taking what is required of them
by law and doing it. When they are given the opportunity
and responsibility to interpret vague laws and to even fill
in large gaps on their own, they will gravitate to overregulation. This does not mean that bureaucrats are sinister
or advantage-seeking, nor does it mean that they are fearful
of being reprimanded in some way if they do not act. Instead
it is simply that their jobs make them prone to overestimate
the ability of government and to get carried away with what
might otherwise be seen as a vague, yet still constraining
statute.
As a result of this overregulation, businesses have seen
an increasingly more hostile and uncertain regulatory
climate and have, in turn, adapted their lobbying strategies
to deal with the uncertainty. These adaptations include,
most notably, an increased demand for revolving door

Existing literature suggests that it is the demand effect of
the level of government activity rather than the supply effect
of the number of active lobbying firms that determines the
degree of interest group mobilization and the volume of
lobbying activity relevant to the issue areas in which the
government is active (Leech et al., 2005). While Leech et al.
(2005) focused on congressional lobbying and the activity of
the federal legislature (measured primarily by the number
of congressional hearings), it illustrates a notable trend in
the world of lobbying that I think can be observed when
it comes to the regulatory activity of the executive branch
and, more specifically, the professional bureaucracy.

Methodology

To test my hypotheses, I performed a cross-sectional
observational study of federal lobbying disclosure data, data
relating to the number of restrictive regulations at the federal
level, and the number of regulatory words making up those
regulations (Al-Ubaydli & McLaughlin, 2014). Organizing
the data by industry category (a subsection of the economy
formulated by the Center for Responsive Politics) provided
variation in the dependent variable, as the regulation data
was organized and filtered by industry according to the
North American Industry Classification Systems (NAICS).
This pairing of lobbying and regulation data allowed me
to investigate the variations in the frequency of revolvers
with clients in a certain industry category and how these
variations correlate with both variations in the number of
restrictive federal regulations and variations in the number
of regulatory words relating to the same industry category.
It should be noted that the incommensurable formats of
the data sources necessitated a degree of cross-tabulation,
which inevitably gave room for subjectivity. The lobbying
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data sourced from the Center for Responsive Politics
(2019) was organized by their proprietary, three-tiered
organizational scheme. The regulation data sourced from
the RegData project at the Mercatus Center was organized
by the more modern and entirely different NAICS system.
This incompatibility meant that I needed to perform a
manual translation between the CRP system and the
NAICS system so that the available regulation data could be
paired with the appropriate categories according to CRP’s
proprietary scheme. In carrying out this manual procedure,
I utilized the NAICS database and the descriptions located
on the United States Census Bureau’s website (Office of
Management and Budget, 2017) and only committed to a
translation if there was significant assuredness that the
NAICS category being considered did, in fact, correspond
to the CRP category being considered. While many
acceptable matches were found, there were many instances
where a match between the two categorization systems
could not be found. There were also instances where the
same NAICS code was paired to more than one CRP
code, resulting in the need to select only one pairing for
use in my analysis. In determining which duplicates to
use, I considered the similarity of each category to other
categories that already had a match made was considered.
If one of the duplicate categories was notably similar to
another category already matched, I omitted it and opted
instead for the duplicate that was likely to increase the
diversity of my sample.

difference existed and that the predictor variable was, in
fact, useful in predicting the dependent variable. This
would essentially result in the ability to assume the validity
of the research hypothesis and to reject the counterclaim to
it (the null hypothesis).

Organizing the data by CRP category resulted in a data
table with individual rows for each of the industry
categories and individual columns containing four test
variables: number of lobbyists with clients in said category
in the observation year, number of revolving door lobbyists
with clients in said category in the observation year,
number of restrictive federal regulations pertaining
to said category in the observation year, and number of
relevant regulatory words pertaining to said category in
the observation year.

Data and Discussion

Two pairwise correlation tests were performed to determine
if a correlation existed between the number of revolving
door lobbyists in each category and the two dependent
variables (the number of restrictive regulations and the
number of relevant regulatory words pertaining to each
industry category). The output of this test included both
a Pearson’s r-value and a probability value (p-value).
The r-value summarized the magnitude of the linear
relationship between the two pairs of variables, whereas
the p-value indicated whether my predictor variables (the
number of restrictive federal regulations and the number
of relevant regulatory words) were useful in predicting the
number of revolvers. If a predictor value was less than 0.05
(p<0.05), there was no difference between the means of
the variables, and it could be concluded that a significant
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After determining that the null hypothesis could be rejected,
two negative binomial regression analyses were conducted.
Due to my data being count data, meaning that I was
Zmerely counting my variables (number of revolving door
lobbyists, restrictive regulations, and regulatory words), a
standard linear regression would likely produce negative
predicted values, which are theoretically impossible because
there could not be a negative number of revolving door
lobbyists. The output of these regression analyses provided
a number of useful figures, such as the beta, which is a
measure that can be used in determining the likelihood of
a change in the dependent variable given a change in an
independent variable.
The model has both explanatory and predictive capabilities,
providing a quantified measure of the degree to which the
two pairs of variables are correlated and an equation that
can be used to predict the frequency of revolving door
lobbyists with clients classified within a given industry
category given the number of restrictive federal regulations
or the number of relevant words contained within the Code
of Federal Regulations.

After performing the cross-tabulation described above,
the remaining sample size (n) was 98. This served as the
number of observations used for the actual data analysis. I
have included the table below, which includes descriptive
statistics for each of the variables being used in this analysis.
I performed a pair-wise correlation test, resulting in a
correlation table containing a number of Pearson r-values
and indications of whether or not the two variables for
which these r-values correspond are significantly different.
The r-value for the frequency of revolvers and the number
of restrictive regulations at the federal level in 2015 is
0.2895. The p-value for these two variables is less than
0.01, meaning that there is statistical significance between
the two variables and that the null hypothesis can be
rejected with 99% certainty. The r-value for the frequency
of revolvers and the number of relevant words in the Code
of Federal Regulations in 2015 is 0.2646. The p-value for
these two variables is less than 0.01, meaning that there is
statistical significance between the two variables and that
the null hypothesis can be rejected with 99% certainty.
Turning to the regression analyses, the pairing of the
frequency of revolvers and the number of restrictive

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Frequency of
Revolvers

Observations
98

Mean
60.09524

Std. Dev.
77.5397

Minimum
1

Maximum
579

Restrictive
Regulations

98

18513.18

26172.31

228.9442

126883.4

Relevant
Regulatory Words

98

1782400

2532941

21152.58

141000000

The same has been done in regards to the number of
regulatory words as the independent variable in Table 3
and Figure 2. Due to the significantly greater values in this
variable than in the preceding one, I made the increments
greater, at every five million. As with the number of

25,000

67.84269

50,000

95.53493

75,000

134.5307

100,000

189.4438

125,000

266.7715

20 0

30 0

400

50 0

Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs

10 0

In Table 2 and Figure 1, artificial reference points along the
independent variable were created at increments of 25,000.
Each of these increments has a corresponding marginal
predictive value—the predicted number of revolving door
lobbyists representing clients within a given industry
category given the number of restrictive regulations
being considered. For example, if there were 75,000
restrictive federal regulations impacting the sugar beet
farming industry, there would be, according to the model,
approximately 135 revolving door lobbyists (134.5307) with
clients categorized within the sugar beet farming industry
according to CRP’s classification scheme.

Independent Variable Event Marginal Predicted Value
(# of regulations)
(# of revolvers)

Revolving Door Lobbyists (predicted)

The betas from the two negative binomial regression tests
are indicative of the slope of a regression line. They are
more useful, however, in determining the likelihood that
the frequency of revolvers will increase given a certain
increase in the independent variable being considered. This
predictive capability is visualized in Table 2 and Figure 1
(for the number of regulations) and Table 3 and Figure 2
(for the number of regulatory words).

Table 2
Predictive Model (Regulations)

0

regulations at the federal level in 2015 was considered. The
negative binomial regression resulted in a beta of 0.0000137,
a standard error of 0.000044, and a z-score of 3.08. I also
looked at the pairing of the frequency of revolvers and
the number of relevant words in the Code of Federal
Regulations in 2015. The negative binomial regression for
these variables resulted in a beta of 0.00000136, a standard
error of 0.00000473, and a z-score of 2.87.

250 0 0

50 0 0 0

750 0 0

10 0 0 0 0

125 0 0 0

industry-relevant restrictions
Figure 1. Predictive Model (Regulations)
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regulations, each of these increments has a corresponding
marginal predictive value—the predicted number of
revolving door lobbyists representing clients within a given
industry category given the number of regulatory words
being considered. Continuing with the earlier example,
if there were 15,000,000 regulatory words impacting the
sugar beet farming industry, there would be, according
to the model, approximately 377 revolving door lobbyists
(376.8755e) with clients categorized within the sugar beet
farming industry according to CRP’s classification scheme.
Table 3
Predictive Model (Relevant Words)
Marginal Predicted Value (#
of revolvers)

5,000,000

96.87115

10,000,000

191.0716

15,000,000

376.8755

20,000,000

743.3608

This argument was evaluated by examining subsectors of
the economy and the prevalence of revolvers, regulations,
and regulatory words in relation to them. Using CRP’s
Lobbying Database and the regulation data made available
by the Mercatus Center’s RegData project, I compiled a
dataset that could be used for further analysis. Finally, I ran
two separate negative binomial regressions—one between
regulations and revolvers and one between regulatory words
and revolvers—to investigate the relationships.

150 0

2000

Adjusted Predictions with 95% CIs

0

50 0

10 0 0

The regression analyses supported both my research
hypotheses. In both regressions, I found a positive
correlation between the variables being examined. The
output data of each of these analyses also allowed for the
construction of a predictive model that could be used to
determine the likely number of revolving door lobbyists
active in an industry category given a certain number of
regulations or of regulatory words relevant to the category.
+0
7
2.0
0e

1.5

0e
+0
7

+0
7
1.0
0e

50

00
00

0

-50 0

Revolving Door Lobbyists (predicted)

Independent Variable
Event (# of words)

industry-relevant words
Figure 2. Predictive Model (Relevant Words)

Conclusion

Since lobbying data has become available over the past
two decades, social scientists have been able to track the
lobbying industry and identify trends within it that might
be particularly impactful to our democracy. The trend that
has probably garnered the most attention aside from the
rapid growth in the amount spent on lobbying activities
has been the prevalence and growth of the revolving door
phenomenon.
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The pundits in media and the public tend to ascribe
the growth of this phenomenon to the corrupt nature of
politicians or to the inescapable temptations of “the swamp.”
In reality, however, the reason has more to do with the
special knowledge and skills that government experience
affords than institutional corruption or the oligarchical
tendencies of elected officials. In the hopes of determining
one of the reasons that the demand for these lobbyists with
government experience is so high, I built upon the works
of LaPira and Thomas (2017), among others, to examine
the relationship between the growth of the so-called
“regulatory state” and the revolving door. Literature suggests
that the rise in revolving door lobbying has coincided with
both the rise in the number of federal regulations and
the increased vagueness of legislation stemming from the
destaffing of key committees in Congress. It would seem,
then, that the growth in regulation is at least partly a factor
in explaining why the number of revolving door lobbyists
continues to grow.
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Despite the support for this hypothesis, the sample size was
small. It could have been increased if there had been greater
time and resources to conduct a more thorough crosstabulation between the CRP and the NAICS classification
systems. Performing a more thorough examination of the
CRP and NAICS categories would have allowed the identification of more pairings, which would have increased the
number of CRP categories available to me when I searched
the RegData files for regulation data and would have led to
a larger number of observations included in the analyses.
My sample size was also constrained by the available
regulation data in the RegData outputs. There were a
number of instances where data on the volume of regulations
corresponding to a certain NAICS code was not located. I
cannot speak to the reason why such data was not included
in the RegData outputs; however, my assumption is that

it stems from a lack of sufficient data for the RegData
algorithm to identify regulatory language that would
correspond to those NAICS codes.
Despite these shortcomings, the analyses produced results
that can be utilized in further research on the revolving
door phenomenon. In addition to dedicating more time and
resources to completing a comprehensive cross-tabulation,
future researchers might also consider adding a temporal
element. This would allow for an examination of whether
the relationship between the regulatory burden and the
prevalence of revolving door lobbyists has existed in the
past and, if it has, whether or not it has been strengthening,
weakening, or remaining constant. A future researcher
might also devise a way to assess each regulation for
“burdensomeness” or how much money and time would
need to be dedicated to complying with each regulation.
This approach would allow for an analysis of the effects of
not only the volume of regulations on the revolving door
phenomenon, but also the effects of the felt weight of those
regulations.
It should also be noted that the increased volume of
regulations is certainly not the only factor contributing
to the prevalence of revolving door lobbyists. The volume
of regulations on a given industry certainly possesses
explanatory capabilities, but it is only part of the explanation.
Other likely factors include the mean market value of the
business entities within each industry and the frequency
of litigation undertaken by business entities within each
industry. It is probable that an industry category containing
businesses with more assets and businesses involved in
more litigation will have a greater frequency of revolvers
representing businesses in that category.
In sum, this research is useful in answering a fundamental
question concerning the nature of our government, the
way it implements policy, and the types of individuals who
seek to influence it. An increase in the regulatory burden
placed upon an industry does correlate with an increase in
the number of revolving door lobbyists representing clients
within that industry.
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